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THE GOSPEL IN THE LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF PASTOR NEUHAUS
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.*
In the recent history of the Lutheran Church there have been
two pastors who in my view resemble one another in many impor-
tant respects: Richard John Neuhaus and Dietrich Bonhoeffer.1
Since, as Shakespeare put it, "comparisons are odorous,"2 it might
be well to note at the outset some striking dissimilarities between
Bonhoeffer and Neuhaus. First, there are some obvious differences
in the context of Hitler's Germany within which Bonhoeffer lived
and died as a modern martyr in 1944, and the American context of
Neuhaus' pastorate, even in the turbulent '60's and early '70's.
Another significant difference lies in the fact that Bonhoeffer felt at
home with the American "realists" like Reinhold Niebuhr. Neuhaus,
in his centennial address at Valparaiso University Law School, in-
timated his posture on theological pragmatism by citing with ap-
proval Herbert Butterfield's famous aphorism that realism is not a
school of thought but merely a boast.8 A third major difference is
that Bonhoeffer, at least in his earlier stage, accepted a
stereotypical theological view of Jews all too common among Chris-
tians. After Hitler's promulgation in 1933 of the "Aryan Clauses"
which excluded those of Jewish origin, regardless of religious affilia-
tion, from holding office in the state, Bonhoeffer wrote a brief tract
on "The Church and the Jewish Question." He observed that "the
Jews [not the Romans] had nailed the redeemer of the world to the
cross" and that they must, therefore, "bear the curse for [their] ac-
tion through a long history of suffering .... But the history of the
suffering of this people, loved and punished by God, stands under
the sign of the final homecoming of the people of Israel to its God.
And this homecoming happens in the conversion of Israel to
Christ."' After the holocaust, these views were repudiated by many
*Associate Professer, University of Notre Dame Law School; Associate Direc-
tor, Center for Constitutional Studies.
1. For a comprehensive biography of Bonhoeffer, see E. BETHGE, DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER: MAN OF VISION, MAN OF COURAGE (1970).
2. Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing, Act III, scene 5.
3. Neuhaus, Law and the Rightness of Things, 14 Val. U.L. Rev. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Neuhaus].
4. D. BONHOEFFER, No RUSTY SWORDS: LETTERS, LECTURES AND NOTES.
1928-1936 226 (1965).
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Christian theologians, including John T. Pawlikowski5  Pastor
Neuhaus would undoubtedly take issue with Pawlikowski's reliance
on some recent works of liberation theology. But it seems clear from
Pastor Neuhaus' long and fruitful associations with rabbis like
Abraham Heschel, from articles on Israel in the magazine edited by
Neuhaus,' and from the reference in the centennial address to the
need for Christianity to reestablish its "bond with living Judaism,"7
that Neuhaus would basically agree with Pawlikowski. At least
Neuhaus takes a more nuanced and more thoughtful position on the
role of the people of Israel in saving history than did the early
Bonhoeffer.
On the other hand, there are some striking similarities between
Neuhaus and Bonhoeffer. Unlike the editors of the religion section of
popular news magazines, I am of the view that Bonhoeffer was pas-
sionately concerned about the purity or orthodoxy of the Christian
faith. Similarly, Pastor Neuhaus may fairly be characterized just as
staunch in resisting any dilution of the Christian message., Another
interesting point of contact between Bonhoeffer and Neuhaus is
unusual amoung Lutheran pastors: neither chose to marry. Although
neither would countenance an absolute ecclesiastical rule coupling
celibacy and Christian ministry, it is not insignificant that both in
fact have been celibates for the sake of the Kingdom (Matthew
19:12), or persons able to spend prodigious amounts of energy in the
bold proclamation of the gospel of Christ. Thirdly, both are well
known theologians who, while remaining loyal sons of the Reforma-
tion, became notable leaders in the ecumenical movement for
greater unity among the divided Christian churches.'
The chief point of contact between these two remarkable
Lutheran pastors which fascinates me is their reflections on the
significance of law and gospel. Both Bonhoeffer and Neuhaus
reflected on these issues at a time when both law and gospel are
5. Among Pawlikowski's many contributions on this theme, see J.
PAWLIKOwsKi, THE CHALLENGE OF THE HOLOCAUST FOR CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY (1978).
6. See, e.g., Sherman, Speaking of God after Auschwitz, 17 WORLDVIEW 26, 29
(Sept. 1974).
7. Neuhaus at 13 (emphasis supplied).
8. This aspect of Pastor Neuhaus' career may be illustrated by the leading role
he played in organizing the "Hartford Statement," a response in 1975 by several leading
American theologians to what they perceived, inter alia, as a loss of a sense of divine
transcendence in some of the writing of some of their colleagues. See P. BERGER & R.
NEUHAUS, AGAINST THE WORLD FOR THE WORLD 1-5 (1976).
9. This aspect of Pastor Neuhaus' career is reflected in the concluding sec-
tion of his centennial address. See Neuhaus at 13.
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threatened with a profound loss of meaning and purpose, and when
the relationship between church and state is experiencing a stormy
period. These themes are central in the address given by Pastor
Neuhaus at the centennial celebration of the Law School at
Valparaiso University. I consider it an honor to add a few comments
in response to that address concerning the jurisprudence of Pastor
Neuhaus, and on the implications of that philosophy (and theology)
of law for legal education in a Lutheran law school.
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PASTOR NEUHAUS
The jurisprudence sketched by Pastor Neuhaus in his address
contained three noteworthy features; a definition of law that is
historical in character rather than naturalistic, a refutation of the ir-
rationality of modern rationalism in legal theory, and an invitation
to discern the "numinous character" of the law.
To be sure, I have the sorts of reservations about Pastor
Neuhaus' jurisprudence that one expects a commentator or reactor
to have. Unlike many academic reactors I have encountered,
however, I should like to underscore my profound agreement with
the main thrust of his essay at the outset, and leave my discussion
of some problematic areas I see in the essay to later.
Historical Definition of the Law
The first feature of Pastor Neuhaus' jurisprudence which
strikes me as extremely valuable is his insistence that law is not a
bundle of eternal verities, but "is part of that communal experience
we call history, including this present moment."10 Neuhaus says that
what he means by "the law" (distinguished from particular laws) is a
"network of binding to which we are related by moral sentiments,"' ,
such as "shame, guilt, resentment, indignation, reciprocity, trust,
[and] mercy," 2 all of which are "inherently relational."'" For
Neuhaus the law is at once profoundly personal"' yet "preeminently
a social phenomenon" and "by definition a public enterprise ...
10. Id at 1.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id at 3.
13. Id. "[Moral sentiments) do not exist in a vacuum; the experience is
related to someone or something beyond itself. Guilt is to say you are sorry; gratitude
is to give thanks; resentment is to protest." Id
14. "[H]owever much our ideas may be socially constructed and conditioned, it
is as individual persons that we give our yes or no to the moral sense that is the foun-
dation of law." Id at 5.
19791
Gaffney: The Gospel in the Law: The Jurisprudence of Pastor Neuhaus
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
18 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
trans-subjective.""8 When Neuhaus essays a definition of the law,
each of the above threads are woven together:
The law is more than a body of rules; it is the historical,
living process of people legislating, adjudicating, ad-
ministering, and negotiating the allocation of rights and
duties. Its purpose is to prevent harm, resolve conflicts,
and create means of cooperation. Its premise, from which
it derives its perceived legitimacy and therefore authority,
is that it strives to anticipate and give expression to what
a people believes to be its collective destiny or ultimate
meaning within a moral universe."8
Perhaps the most laudable feature of this historical definition
of law is that Neuhaus has in a stroke managed to transcend the in-
dividualist bias of the Enlightenment that has informed so much of
western legal thought. In so doing Neuhaus resembles the German
theologian, John B. Metz, who has sharply criticized the formal em-
phasis of much of contemporary theology on the existential situation
of an individual decision."' Like Metz, Neuhaus has a view of history
in which people matter, not solely as solipsistic or atomistic units,
but as members of a community which understands the meaning of
solidarity.
A second important element of Neuhaus' insistence on the
historical character of the law is its openness to the future. At one
point he writes of the "anticipatory" quality of the law in the follow-
ing terms: "It reaches forward, so to speak, to embrace an ex-
cellence of 'right order' that has not yet been actualized. Law is
therefore always provisional, the 'isness' never perfectly embodies
the 'oughtness' the 'now' is at its best only a preview of the promised
'not yet'."" This statement undoubtedly describes the experience of
all of us who deal with the law. Even those who would reduce
American law to some tidy and orderly schemes (such as the dons of
the American Law Institute with their restatements and model
codes) would concede that their efforts are never at an end.
Although the experience is familiar, the terms Neuhaus uses to
describe it are probably not, for he has appropriated the language of
15. "However we severally acknowledge that which is binding, it is togetler
that we spell out those acknowledgements in the bonding that creates community." AL
16. Id. at 6.
17. See J. METZ, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD 108-11 (1971).
18. Neuhaus at 11.
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contemporary theologians like Oscar Cullmann 19 and Werner Georg
Klummel." They reemphasized the contrast between a linear,
forward-moving concept of time found in the Bible and a pagan
model of cyclical time in which there is no real progress but only
eternal return.2 1 Neuhaus, indeed, explicitly refers to Eliade and
others who have noted a strong similarity in this respect between
the "scientific" worldview of the Enlightenment and the "primitive"
worldviews of ancient times:
There is finally no real history, no real contingency, no
real change; the world is either composed of static entities
or what looks like change is simply a cyclical recurrence
of the same old thing. The Judeo-Christian tradition,
however, is premised upon the notion of real history, real
change, happening is an incomplete universe that is still
awaiting its promised fulfillment.'
This focus on the future is the key to another element in
Neuhaus' theological jurisprudence- his distinction between cove-
nant and contract. This distinction occurs only once at the beginning
of the centennial address and without pointed reference to
categories of time: "Contracts spare us the uncertainties of human
relationships. The covenant of trust mutually pledged is, by com-
parison, precarious and arduous in its demand for constant renewal
in love."' Neuhaus regards the covenant-contract distinction as
crucial to the way we think about this country, its past, present, and
future. And he has explicity read into these categories a temporal
schema. The first way of thinking is for Neuhaus future-oriented:
"Covenant thinking envisions America as a lively experiment with
promises to keep and a destiny to be realized within universal
history. . . . The covenant appeals to the future for its ultimate
legitimation. It can finally be 'proved' correct only by the vindica-
tion of reasonable hope."24 By contrast, Neuhaus views contract
thinking as locked into the past:
19. See 0. CULLMANN, CHRIST AND TIME: THE PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION
OF TIME AND HISTORY (2d ed. 1964); 0. CULLMANN. SALVATION IN HISTORY (1967).
20. See W. KUMMEL, PROMISE AND FULFILLMENT: THE ESTCHATOLOGICAL
MESSAGE OF JESUS (1957).
21. See, e.g., M. ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN (1954).
22. Neuhaus at 11. Neuhaus likewise suggests that "the idea of the 'ongoing-
ness' of law-the way it develops and grows incrementally and corrects itself-is inde-
pendent upon the Judeo-Christian understanding of history." Id
23. Id at 1.
24. R. NEUHAUS. TIM, TOWARD HOME 128 (1975).
1979]
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The contract metaphor, on the other hand, suggests a ra-
tional ordering of processes and goals, a bargain struck
and adhered to for mutual advantage.... Contract think-
ing must seek its legitimating foundations in what already
exists. In its search it turns toward a Golden Age to be
reestablished or to some other version of what is
"natural." Contract doctrine is closely linked in one way
or the another to the Edenic Myth.2 '
Both Neuhaus' general view of the historical character of law
and his distinction between covenant and contract are put to use in
his critique of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice." Neuhaus notes in
his centennial address that Rawls' "noble effort" is "elegantly
argued and justly influential" and that it "should be welcomed by all
who care about the foundation and future of law."'7 After summariz-
ing the basic argument of the book, Neuhaus offers the telling
criticism that Rawls' "laudable intention" (of restoring "legitimacy
to law by developing a normative truth to which otherwise
capricious laws are subject"") miscarries because it denies that law
is a historical, living process in which real people allocate rights and
duties:
Rawls' people behind the veil are, in fact, non-persons.
They have no history, no tradition, no vested interests, no
self knowledge, no loves, no hates, no dreams of transcen-
dent purpose. Instead of re-thinking life and law, Rawls
has simply subsumed life into a totally abstracted notion
of justice that could not be farther removed from the real
world in which the legitimacy of law must constantly be
renewed."
Neuhaus links Rawls with contract thinking which, as we have seen,
Neuhaus regards as bound up with the past: "Rawls and many other
theorists assume a universe in which everything is already in
place."' In Time Toward Home, Neuhaus makes this criticism more
pointedly:
Rawls rests everything upon the logic emerging from "the
original position." Again we encounter, although in new
and intriguing form, the Myth of the Return. If only we
25. I&
26. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
27. Neuhaus at 9.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 10-11.
30. Id. at 11.
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can get back behind history, if only we can abrogate the
particularistic distortions caused by experience in time,
we will somehow get in touch with the really real .... As
with almost all who would discover the truth in Nature
and, so incidentally, Nature's God, Rawls would argue
from a static and . . . highly mechanistic universe ....
Like Bacon, he would have us play hide-and-seek with a
reality that has been hidden by history and is to be
sought in nature, including "human nature". 1
Because Neuhaus understands reality as an unfulfilled, still-
provisional project, he can only regard Rawls' theory of law as
seriously flawed. Rawls' theory gives priority to an atemporal and
hypothetical view of the law which Neuhaus associates with contract
thinking. In short, Rawls fails because he attempts to write on an
historical subject, law, without taking history seriously.
Perhaps the most extraordinary ahistorical component of
Rawls' theory is his "special assumption in that a rational individual
does not suffer from envy."" This assumption is of course a conven-
ient one, for in a stroke Rawls has eliminated the rationality of evil
in human history. In this view, though evil be massive and gro-
tesquely genocidal as Cromwell on the Irish, or Hitler on the Jews,
it may not be viewed as real in a theory of justice because it is merely
irrational. To be sure, some scholars have explicity supported this
notion by claiming, for example, that it is immoral to search for
meaning in the holocaust." Others, however, insist that although it
might offer some relief to place the holocaust in the category of the
irrational, that choice must be eschewed:
One must recognize the rational origins of the
Holocaust. It was a planned event with roots in
philosophies developed by thinkers still recognized as
giants of liberal Western thought. In reflecting about the
Holocaust, one must confront theological attitudes central
to Christianity almost from its inception. The ideological
parents of the Holocaust- Western philosophy and Chris-
tian theology -represent the mainstream of western
culture and not its lunatic fringe."
31. R. NEUHAUS. supra note 24, at 134; but see note 78 infra.
32. J. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 143.
33. See, e.g., Fackenheim, The People Israel Lives, 87 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
563-68 (1970); E. FACKENHEIM. GOD'S PRESENCE IN HISTORY (1970).
34. J. PAWLIKOWSKI, supra note 5, at 4.
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Neuhaus clearly comes down on the side of confronting the full
horror of historical events like the holocaust. He integrates this
choice into his theory of law when he rejects the ahistorical contrac-
tual model of rationality constructed by Rawls as "an indulgence of
naturalistic fantasies about human nature," as "liberal seepage of ir-
responsible sentimentality," and as "an illusory escape from
history's horrors, from both the Gargantuan horrors such as
Auschwitz and the quotidian horrors of the jealousies, fears, com-
pulsive pettinesses and cruelties that are our lot."* If Lutheran
pessimism about human nature lies beneath Pastor Neuhaus' rejec-
tion of Rawls' sentimental notion of an envyless species, Lutheran
hope in the triumph of grace abounds in Neuhaus' notion that the
horrors of history do not have the last word. Alluding again to his
model of convenantal thinking, Neuhaus asserts that the way to
counter these horrors is "by appeal to what may yet be, not by seek-
ing refuge in an idealized past or in a fantastical notion of human
nature.""
The Irrationality of Rationalism
In the jurisprudence of Pastor Neuhaus, the law is not self-
legitimating. If it is to be obeyed, it is because of the something
beyond law itself. Neuhaus acknowledges the contribution of scien-
tific method in breaking down authoritarian models of legal theory
which commanded obedience solely on the basis that "the king or
the church or the Bible or tribal custom says so."' The tautology
that the law is the law is the law is for Neuhaus plainly insufficient.
Accordingly, he can describe the Enlightenment as a liberation
from such authoritarianism. But he is quick to point out that the ra-
tionalistic spirit of the Enlightenment is itself irrational when it for-
bids a challenge to the authority of law beyond the positivist dic-
tates of legislature or court. He tweaks contemporary positivism by
noting its similarity with medieval authoritarianism: "The king for-
bade the challenge ['By what authority?'] because it was deemed im-
pious or insubordinate. Certain moderns forbid the challenge
because it is deemed meaningless or irrelevant. But the point is that
both proscribe what is the foundation of the authority that law
claims for itself."
And he states that there is an insidious character in the new
authoritarianism precisely because it masks itself as freedom:
35. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 24, at 136.
36. Id.
37. Neuhaus at 6.
38. Id. at 6-7.
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The slavery that claims to be freedom is the most
desperate slavery because it has subsumed into itself the
idea of emancipation. Much juridical theory today-as in-
deed much thought in other disciplines -is in bondage to a
species of rationality that refuses to ask, or even forbids
the asking of, the questions that get in the way of making
jurisprudence an "exact science.""
The Numinous Character of the Law
Pastor Neuhaus has pointed the way toward an understanding
that the law "partakes of a numinous, even a divine character that,
like religion, is binding."'0 The significant thing about this step in
Neuhaus' jurisprudence is that he avoids saying that the law is to be
obeyed on the strength either of its self-sufficiency or of some ex-
trinsic power, be it of king or church, legislature or court. Rather,
the numinous character of the law arises from within the human ex-
perience of law as incomplete and as even in need of reference to
questions of right and wrong: "Critical reason invokes the
'oughtness' of things in order to bring the 'isness' of things under
judgment.""
In his methodical rejection of extrinsicism in his argument,
Neuhaus resembles the brilliant French philosopher, Maurice Blon-
del (1861-1949). In his major work, L'Action,'0 Blondel set forth a
program of formulating a notion of trancendence or of the super-
natural that does not rely on an "outsider God" or theological "Deus
ex machina."" For Neuhaus there is a legitimate role for theology in
jurisprudence precisely because what he means by theology is the
disciplined application of critical reason to the meaning of life. It is
the exploration of ultimate meaning, the source and purpose of all
reality. For Neuhaus it "is important to underscore that, while
theology may speak of the supernatural and of other worlds, its
meaning is the meaning of this life, this world, this history of which
we are part."" With this understanding of the theological enter-
prise, it is easy for him to conclude that "in law or any other field,
39. I& at 7.
40. Id at 5.
41. Id at 7.
42. M. BLONDEL, L'ACTION, ESSAI D'UNE CRITIQUE DE LA VIE ET D'UNE SCIENCE DE
LA PRATIQUE (1893).
43. For valuable studies of Blondel's thought, see H. BOUILLARD, BLONDEL AND
CHRISTIANITY (1969); J. LACROIX, MAURICE BLONDEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAN AND
HIS PHILOSOPHY (1968); J. SOMERVILLE, TOTAL COMMITMENT: BLONDEL'S "L'ACTION"
(1968). See also G. BAUM, MAN BECOMING: GOD IN SECULAR EXPERIENCE 1-36 (1970).
44. Neuhaus at 9.
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the search for ultimate meanings that provide morally binding
legitimacy . . . is a theological search.' 5
Critical Observations
As I stated above, I am fundamentally in accord with the
jurisprudence I have outlined above. Some aspects of this program,
however, seem to me to require further elaboration or correction. I
submit these comments in the hope that further dialogue and reflec-
tion will yield yet a stronger view of the law and its legitimacy than
that already sketched so brilliantly by Pastor Neuhaus.
I have, for example, intimated that I admire the Blondelian ap-
proach Neuhaus appears to have adopted in his characterization of
law as a theological enterprise. But just as Blondel's search for an
intrinsic way of demonstrating the need for supernatural never
diminished his commitments as a Roman Catholic," so also Neuhaus'
search for a transcendent referent point within the law should in no
way diminish his commitments as a Lutheran. Yet I find some ap-
parent discrepancies between some of Neuhaus' views and those I
have come to associate with Lutheran confessional postures which
call for more work if Neuhaus' jurisprudence is to be taken as
authentically Lutheran.
First, the Lutheran emphasis on sola scrptura leads me to ex-
pect that at some point in his address Neuhaus would refer to the
authority of scripture. For in the light of contemporary biblical
scholarship on the communal and historical character of the process
known as inspiration,'7 this theme need not lead one back into ex-
trinsicism. Nor, indeed, must the theme of revelation itself be viewed
in extrinsicist terms."
A future elaboration of the theological aspects of Neuhaus
jurisprudence might well take into account the following biblical
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., M. BLONDEL, L'UNITE CATHOLIQUE: EXIGENCIED PHILOSOPHIQUES DU
CHRISTIANISME 97-111 (1950).
47. See, e.g., McCarthy, Personality, Society and Inspiration, 24 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 553-76 (1963), and McKenzie, The Social Character of Inspiration, 24 CATH.
BIBLICAL Q. 115-24 (1962), on the related issue of scriptural inerrancy. See also Lohfink,
Uber die Irrtumslosigkeit und die Einheit der Schrift, 174 STIMMEN DER ZEIT 161-81
(1964).
48. See, e.g., Barr, Revelation through History in the Old Testament and
Modern Theology, 17 INTERPRETATION 193-205 (1963); R. FUNK, HISTORY AND
HERMENEUTIC (1967); W. PANNENBERG, REVELATION AS HISTORY (1968); J. ROBINSON & J.
COBB, THEOLOGY AS HISTORY (1967).
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themes: (1) the dependency, at least in form, of the central biblical
theme of covenant (brith) on secular contracts or suzerainty treaties
especially between the Hittite kings and their vassals;' (2) the
distinctive purposes and methods of those responsible for the dif-
ferent strata within Pentateuchal law or the Torah; 50 (3) the meaning
and scope of the decalogue;"' (4) the reasons why some of the pro-
phets abandoned the legal terminology of brith and began to
employ personal or familiar metaphors such as "bride" to describe
the relationship of Israel with its Lord;"2 (5) the exaltation of the law
in Israel's worship (Psalms);M (6) the variety of attitudes of Israelites
towards the law of their pagan conquerors and overlords, the Egyp-
tians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, and
the Romans;" (7) the varieties of viewpoints on the meaning of
history in Israel: traditio-historical, prophetic, and apocalyptic;N (8)
49. See, e.g., Mendenhall, Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near
East, 17 BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGIST 26-46, 49-76 (1954). For a critical review of the
literature, see D. MCCARTHY, OLD TESTAMENT COVENANT: A SURVEY OF CURRENT OPI-
NIONS (1972).
50. For example, one might contrast the author of Deuteronomy, who general-
ly offers some event in Israel's past as the reason for obeying the Commandments (see,
e.g., Deuteronomy 16:1-8), with the priestly group responsible for the laws regarding
the ritual of sacrifice and legal purity; the priestly legislation seldom includes a clause
explaining the historical reason why it should be obeyed. See, e.g., Leviticus 2: 1-16;
but see Leviticus 19: 2-4. On the complicated question of Pentateuchal source criticism,
see 0. EISSFELDT, THE OLD TESTAMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 155-241 (1965); M. NOTH, A
HISTORY OF PENTATEUCHAL TRADITIONS (1972). A less technical account is found in P.
ELLIS. THE MEN AND MESSAGE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 51-99 (1963).
51. That is, are all the commandments binding equally on all persons? See,
e.g., E. NIELSEN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN NEW PERSPECTIVE: A TRADITIO-
HISTORICAL APPROACH (1968); A. PHILLIPS, ANCIENT ISRAEL'S CRIMINAL LAW: A NEW AP-
PROACH TO THE DECALOGUE (1970); J. STAMM & M. ANDREW, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN
RECENT RESEARCH (1967).
52. See, e.g., Hosea 1: 2-9.
53. See, e.g., Psalms 119.
54. See, e.g., Genesis 39-41; 2 Macabees 6-9.
55. For a brief summary of these three positions, see D. TRACY, ESCHATOLOGY:
A CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO TIME AND HISTORY 53-55 (1967). For a theology of the Old
Testament in which the historico-traditional model is central, see W. EICHRODT, 1
THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT (1961). For a treatment of the prophetic view of
history, see A. HESCHEL, 1 THE PROPHETS: AN INTRODUCTION 159-200 (1963); R. SCOTT,
THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROPHETS 142-215 (2d. 1968). On the connection between pro-
phecy and apocalyptic, see, e.g., Vawter, Apocalyptic: Its Relation to Prophecy, 22
CATH. BIBLICAL Q. 33-46 (1960). On apocalyptic generally, see M. RIST, Apocalypticism,
in 1 INTERPRETER'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 157-61 (1963). Among the abundant
literature on this theme in New Testament scholarship, see the provocative essay of E.
KASEMANN. On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic, in NEW TESTAMENT
QUESTIONS OF TODAY 108-37 (1969).
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the profound religious and ethical significance of the rabbinic
teachings (haggadah and hallakah);" (9) the meaning and scope of the
ethical teachings of Jesus;57 and (10) the thorny problem of the mean-
ing and scope of apostolic teaching concerning doctrine, ethics, and
church polity." To be sure, this decalogue of biblical themes relevant
to a theological jurisprudence can be refined, expanded and con-
tracted. Merely to state them suggests how much careful, detailed
work of integration must yet occur before we have a jurisprudence
which takes into account the biblical experience of law.
Secondly, if it is somewhat surprising that a Lutheran pastor
gives so little attention to the scriptures in elaborating a new
jurisprudence for our times, I found it no less surprising that the
Law-Gospel theme of the Reformation received no mention at all in
Pastor Neuhaus' address. To be sure this theme is itself rather com-
plicated. 9 This is not the place to unravel whether there is in a
duplex, a triplex, or a quadruplex usus legis in Lutheran confes-
sional documents. Suffice it to say that as I understand Martin
Luther's exegesis of key Pauline passages, the primary use of the
law is to insure that no one can be smug or self-righteous. All of us
fail against the commands of the law and therefore stand in need of
the grace of redemption announced in the gospel and made available
to those who believe its message. Given the strength of this view
within Lutheran thought, I would hope that Pastor Neuhaus makes
some attempt either to retrieve the tradition and mediate its mean-
ing for our age or to explain why it no longer is as compelling as
when it was framed.
A secondary use of the law is its political or civil function of en-
suring order in society. The very fact that one use of the law is
termed "theological" while the other is termed "civil or political" re-
quires some explanation. There are hints in the centennial address
that Pastor Neuhaus is not at home with this dichotomy between
the theological and the political. However, the limits on the political
56. For a sympathetic treatment of rabbinic sources as the foundation of
Christian thought, see, e.g., E. FISHER, FAITH WITHOUT PREJUDICE (1977). See also R.
SCHNACKENBURG, THE MORAL TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 56-89 (1965).
57. For example, do they abrogate or fulfill Torah and the prophets?. Do the
parables bespeak an interim ethic? Is the Sermon on the Mount equally binding on
all? See generally, R. SCHNACKENBERG. supra note 56.
58. See, e.g., Kasemann, The Canon of the New Testament and the Unity of
the New Testament Church, in ESSAYS ON NEW TESTAMENT THEMES 95-107 (1964).
59. See, e.g., D. BONHOEFFER. ETHICS 303-19 (1963); G. EBELING, LUTHER: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT 110-40 (1970); T. McDONOUGH, THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL IN
LUTHER: A STUDY OF MARTIN LUTHER'S CONFESSIONAL WRITINGS (1963).
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use of the law and on the power of the prince are not as clearly
delineated as they ought to be. For example, Neuhaus speaks of a
person who thinks a particular rule silly or unfair but obeys
nonetheless when told "but that's the law."" Neuhaus knows well
that blind or mindless obedience to lawless authority is no virtue.
Indeed, his evangelical witness on behalf of life during the time of
the war in Southeast Asia spoke more powerfully than any of his
writings on the limits of obedience to governmental authority. One
would hope, though, that Neuhaus would give greater priority and
even a sense of urgency to the duty to disobey unjust (for that
reason illegal?) commands of the sovereign.
From the time of the Peasants' Revolt, Lutheran leaders have
tended to accentuate the power of the secular legal authority, usually
justifying this posture by reference to Romans 13." In our time,
Lutheran pastors like Bonhoeffer and Neuhaus have led the way in
illustrating that resistance can be a religious virtue. Bonhoeffer's ex-
ecution by the Nazis deprives us of the mature reflection of that
heroic figure on the meaning of the virtue of resistance. Neuhaus
now owes it to us to offer us his version of this virtue, and perhaps
to warn us when it can become a vice."
Thirdly, I was disappointed with the rather casual way in
which Pastor Neuhaus seemed to dismiss as reductionist ideologues
those who, in my judgment, have provided penetrating socio-
60. Neuhaus at 6.
61. See, e.g., Luther, Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should be Obeyed
in 3 WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 231-71 (1930) [hereinafter cited as WORKS]; An Admoni-
tion to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia, in 4 WORKS
219-44 (1931); Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants, in 4 WORKS
248-54, (1931).
In the last piece the use of scripture is dubious from an evangelical perspective. For
example, in a burst of invective Luther urges the princes to "offer the mad peasants to
come to terms, even though they are not worthy of it." But should the princes' terms not
be acceded to, the princes are reminded by Luther that they "are battling not only
against flesh and blood, but against spiritual wickedness in the air," and are enjoined to
"stab, smite, slay" the rebellious peasants. Like crusaders given papal promises of eter-
nal rewards for slaughtering infidels, the princes of Germany were told by Luther: "If
you die in doing it [slaying and smiting the peasants], well for you! A more blessed death
can never be yours, for you die in obeying the divine Word and commandment in
Romans xiii, and in loving service of your neighbor, whom you are rescuing from the
bonds of hell and of the devil." Id. at 253-54.
For a different perspective on Romans 13 and a contrast with Revelation 13, see 0.
CULLMANN, THE STATE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT (1956); W. STRINGFELLOW, CONSCIENCE
AND OBEDIENCE: THE POLITICS OF ROMANS 13 AND REVELATION 13 IN LIGHT OF THE SECOND
COMING (1977). See also K. BARTH, CHURCH AND STATE (1939).
62. See, e.g., B. HARING, A THEOLOGY OF PROTEST (1970).
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economic analyses of the American legal sytem and of the distribu-
tion aspects of justice in our society." This comment may be reading
far too much into Neuhaus' rejection of "psychological and other ex-
planatory systems."" But the absence of class analysis in his address
prompts me to refer explicitly to those who have analyzed the struc-
tures which predetermine the outcome of the distributive question,
to suggest that many, if not most, of these scholars are neither
Rawlsian nor vulgar Marxists, and that-in any event-Marxists
have no monopoly on this kind of economic analysis."
In offering this criticism, I am keenly aware that I am telling
Pastor Neuhaus nothing he does not already know from years of ser-
vice among the poor. But it bears repeating that the law as a
system, and not simply in a few particular instances, operates in
dramatically different ways for rich and poor. And it simply will not
do for those of us who follow heir to the tradition of Amos and
Micah either to ignore manifest social and economic injustice as we
construct a new jurisprudence, or to diminish the magnitude of our
common task with the unverified and unverifiable assertion that
"millions [which millions?] took comfort" in the callous comment of
millionaire John Kennedy that "Life is unfair.""
IMPLICATIONS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF PASTOR NEUHAUS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
It should be clear by now that the jurisprudence of Pastor
Neuhaus contains a generous overlay of theology admixed with his
philosophy of law. It should likewise be clear that I do not take
issue with the attempt to work out a theological jurisprudence but
only suggest that Pastor Neuhaus or others now elaborate that pro-
ject in greater detail.
One of the distinct advantages of working out such a
theological jurisprudence would be the stimulation it would offer to
those of us engaged in legal education at universities affiliated with
a Christian church. I doubt that if we took such a jurisprudence
seriously we could continue doing business as usual.
63. See, M. HORWITz. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
See also J. AUERBACH. UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976).
64. Neuhaus at 4.
65. See, e.g., GOD'S CALL TO PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (G. Forell & W. Lazareth
eds. 1978); F. PERELLA, POVERTY IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL POWER
(1974).
66. R. NEUHAUS. supra note 24, at 137.
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Since Pastor Neuhaus has already sketched the framework of
this sort of legal theory, it is well to inquire as to implications in his
views for the way we operate our law schools. To summarize,
Neuhaus has insisted that jurisprudence be personalist and com-
munitarian, grounded in the experience of history and open to a yet
undisclosed future. I would maintain that this view has significant
consequences for our admissions procedures, for what we do with
students while they are with us, for our placement offices, and what
our alumni and alumnae do as lawyers after they leave us.
Admissions
Currently the vast majority of American law schools place an
extraordinary amount of reliance on the Law School Aptitude Test
(LSAT). Like other mechanistic measurements of fitness for en-
trance in the American definition of the good life, this test has
scored poorly in its ability to discern the talents of members of
racial minorities long excluded from professional schools. 7 Hence
law schools throughout the country began in the 1960's a formal, if
unconscious, assault on the LSAT. This was true at least with
respect to race. Through our affirmative action programs, we began
saying, and rightly so in my opinion, that there are other important
data about the persons who apply to our schools for admission than
the numbers crunched by the Educational Testing Service at
Princeton.
Perhaps Neuhaus exaggerated in his claim that "the litigious
life is no life at all,"" for once the professional schools acknowledged
their dangerous deviation from mechanistic determinants, lawyers
discovered flaws in the underlying argument in support of affirm-
ative action and in the design of specific programs. They presented
these points of view in major litigation, notably by Marc De Funis
and Allan Bakke." The mathematics of the Bakke case is somewhat
complicated. However, I think it is fair to say that the upshot of the
lawsuit is that five Justices of the Supreme Court are of the view
that a professional school at a state university may take the race of
an applicant into account, but that its affirmative action program
should not be designed-and few are-as foolishly as that at the
medical school of the University of California at Davis.
67. See, e.g., Sandoval, Why the LSAT Does Not Test Chicanos, 6 TEX. S.L.
REV. 31 (1979).
68. Neuhaus at 1.
69. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); De Funis
v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312
(1974). See also Steelworkers v. Weber. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
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If this is a fair reading of the Court's holding, two further
points should be made. First, because there was no clear decision on
the Title VI claim brought by Allan Bakke, the case does not formally
control the admissions policies of independent universities. Dallin H.
Oaks, the president of the largest church related university in the
country (Brigham Young University) made this point recently:
Scholarly comments and public debate about the Bakke
case have also ignored the essential difference between
public and independent institutions. This voluminous
literature generally seems to assume that the Bakke deci-
sion governs the admission practices of all of higher
education. But Bakke involved a public institution, and in-
dependent colleges and universities should have greater
latitude in student admissions. An independent institution
not receiving any direct assistance from tax appropria-
tions should be free to have preferential admissions-even
the kind of quotas the Bakke case outlawed for the
University of California-to benefit racial and other
minorities, if they choose to do so. The Bakke case does
not hold to the contrary. Granted, this kind of latitude
may be abused in some instances. But if private parties
lack the freedom to make wrong decisions, they lack
freedom indeed. 71
Secondly, the Bakke decision was limited to the race factor in
the admission program. If, for example, a religiously affiliated law
school were consciously to adopt a policy of giving preference to
those whose religious commitments are clear, the school would not
be precluded from doing so by the Bakke case or, indeed, by any ex-
isting federal statute or administrative regulation."1 I do not think it
would be a wise policy for such a school to exclude from its company
all persons who do not share the faith commitments of the sponsor-
ing religious body. For even in matters of religon there is much to
be gained in the contrast of sharply opposed views. For that very
reason, it strikes me as foolish for a religiously affiliated law school
to maintain the pretense of being distinctive if it fails to care about
70. Address by Dallin H. Oaks. entitled Government Regulation of Higher
Education, before the Pennsylvania Association of Colleges and Universities (Sept. 11,
1978).
71. See E. GAFFNEY. JR.. & P. MOOTs. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CAMPUS:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION ch. III (to be
published in 1980).
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the religious perspectives of those in its company. The direc-
tor of research at Valparaiso University has made this point tellingly
in the context of his evaluation of Lutheran higher education:
It is necessary for a college to maintain its reputation and
sense of mission and this should not be sacrificed for
numbers of students. Limiting enrollments consistent with
institutional mission will allow an institution to maintain a
distinctive purpose. Some institutions already have a
limited Lutheran enrollment. In fact, in some cases,
Lutherans are a relatively small minority. Apparently
some institutions view their Lutheran affiliation as
nominal. The data suggest there are a number of institu-
tions which have from 30 to 60/0 Lutheran students.
These institutions are at a critical juncture in their
history. If Lutheran affiliation is to permeate the lifeblood
of an institution, it will be necessary to retain a solid core
of Lutheran students. . . . While non-Lutherans should
never feel excluded on a campus, nevertheless, the
Lutheran spirit of scholarship, inquiry, and quest for
moral and social implications of issues should never be
compromised. If an institution is to be distinctive and unique,
it must foster and support essential characteristics which
make it unique."
Curriculum and Campus Life
The construction of a viable theological jurisprudence would
likewise call for serious rethinking about what we do in the three or
four years that students spend in our law schools.
In the wake of Watergate, there was a rush in the law schools
to the quick fix of new courses on legal ethics. Although laudable in
intent, this movement would undoubtedly have greater impact if the
courses were taught by trained ethicians prepared to criticize
wherever necessary the received ethics and rules of etiquette of the
bar. Similarly, I imagine that after the publication of Professor Ber-
man's programmatic essay,"' and after Pastor Neuhaus has com-
pleted the work he has begun so well, there will appear in law
school catalogues a crop of courses entitled "Law and Religion."
Once again such a development would be desirable. But it might be
more important for law schools willing to take Neuhausian
72. G. GREINKE, SURVIVAL WITH A PURPOSE: A MASTER PLAN REVISITED 63 (1978).
73. H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).
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jurisprudence seriously to focus their attentions on attracting to
their faculties some of the increasing number of persons with dual
competence in law and theology. In this manner the religious and
ethical components of law could be highlighted in many of our
course offerings and not relegated to the fringe of the curriculum.
Two other theological considerations suggest that reform of
our law schools should not be confined to faculty recruitment and
curriculum design, but should permeate the way we treat one
another on our campuses. First, Christians are persons whose inner-
most vision is supposed to be enlightened so that they know the
great hope to which they are called (Ephesians 1:18). Pastor
Neuhaus intimates this theme of hope by referring to the yet un-
disclosed future as the ground for living under the law and for work-
ing for its reform. When the theme of Christian hope is more fully
elaborated, attitudes about the future must be sharpened. On the
one hand, Christians cannot smugly pretend to know more about the
details of the future than do their non-Christian companions, for that
would be to deny the "not yet" of divine revelation. On the other
hand, the paradox of the Christian interpretation of history is that
the final reality, the eschaton, has already broken in upon us prolep-
tically in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.7' To paraphrase the
English title of the Festschrift for Rudolf Bultmann's eightieth birth-
day,"5 we Christians should be engaged in the task of remembering
our future. Or to employ the language of various interpreters of the
parables of Jesus, our hope is grounded in a "realized eschatology,"76
or, more accurately, in an "eschatology in the process of
realization.""'
If this fundamental aspect of Christian theology were taken
seriously in church related law schools, perhaps we would not be
populated with as many legal Eeyores whose pessimism about the
universe is adorned with the name of "realism." To be sure, biblical
hope is not to be confused with a naive, Whiggish view of history as
ineluctable progress. The eminent paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de
74. See, e.g., C. BRAATEN, THE FUTURE OF GOD: THE REVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
OF HOPE (1969); R. FULLER. THE MISSION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF JESUS (1954); W. PAN-
NENBERG, JESUS: GOD AND MEN (1968); E. SCHILLEBEECKX, GOD, THE FUTURE OF MAN
(1968).
75. J. ROBINSON, THE FUTURE OF OUR RELIGIOUS PAST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
RUDOLF BULTMANN (1971). The original German title was less suggestive: Zeit und
Geschichte [Time and History] (1964).
76. See, e.g., C.H. DODD. THE PARABLES OF THE KINGDOM (1958).
77. See, e.g., J. JEREMIAS, THE PARABLE OF JESUS (1963).
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Chardin, described the hopeful attitude I have in mind, when he
stated to the Congress of Science and Religion in New York in 1941:
Whether from immobilist reaction, sick pessimism or
simply pose, it has become "good form" to deride or
mistrust anything that looks like faith in the future.
"Have we ever moved? Are we still moving? And if so,
are we going forward or back or simply in a circle?"
This is an attitude of doubt that will prove fatal if we
do not take care, because in destroying the love of life it
also destroys the life-force of Mankind....
[H]owever bitter our disillusionment with human
goodness in recent years, there are stronger scientific
reasons than ever before for believing that we do really
progress and that we can advance much further still, pro-
vided we are clear about the direction in which progress
lies and are resolved to take the right road."
If hope is to be found in the minds and hearts of those who
make up the communities of our law schools, the greatest of gifts,
love, cannot be absent. Put plainly this means that academic in-
fighting, destructive pettiness and jealous rivalry ought not to be
found among us, let alone rewarded. To the extent that such envy
permeates our faculties (perhaps to the amazement of Professor
Rawls), we ought not be surprised when we discover a destructive
spirit of competition among our students which manifests itself in
terms of stolen notes, fraudulent puffery to employers (half of a
class reporting they made the top ten percent), or banal theft of law
review articles zipped out of their covers.
To be sure the spirit of love need not be the spirit of
Cromwellian leveling (small chance that Cromwell would be described
in terms of love by an Irishman!). Some sense of competition will
and should remain among us. But it should take the form of a call
for each to excel by achieving his or her greatest potential, not to
78. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, SOME REFLECTIONS ON PROGESS. in THE FUTURE OF
MAN 64 (1964). The frontispiece of this volume is an excerpt from a letter from
Teilhard to Mme. George-Marie Haardt: "The whole future of the Earth, as of religion,
seems to me to depend on the awakening of our faith in the future." Neuhaus must
either demonstrate that the dynamic view of nature proposed by Teilhard and other
scientists is somehow wrong, or he must correct his own view of nature as static. I
suspect that Neuhaus' view of nature is but a convenient rhetorical device to enable
history to emerge as the more significant category. See text accompanying note 31
supFra.
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get ahead by leaving the corpses of our brothers in our wake.79
Placement and Alumni-Alumnae
Finally, the jurisprudence of Pastor Neuhaus has consequences
for the way we run our placement offices. Since the obvious purpose
of legal education is to get people out of law schools into the prac-
tice of law (save for the desparate remnant of odd ones like myself
who choose to go back to law school in a very special form of law
practice), what our alumni and alumnae do when they leave us
should be a matter of no small concern. Many in the current genera-
tion of law students seem to have fixed univocal views on the kind
of practice in which they will engage. To be sure, our students are
not kids who can be cajoled or coerced about their career choices.
But at minimum we ought through our placement offices to try to
expand our students' horizons about the many kinds of legal prac-
tice. This must include some form of service to the unrepresented
and the under-represented, in which they might find genuine
satisfaction. And we surely ought never to reinforce the current
craze for the fastest and biggest buck, lest we lose our very souls in
the bargain.
CONCLUSION: THE DUTY TO RESIST
I began this essay with a comparison between Richard John
Neuhaus and his fellow pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. At one point I
noted that the early Bonhoeffer limited his concern for German
Jews to those who were baptized Christians. Anyone familiar with
the life of Bonhoeffer knows that throughout the 1930's he was a
leader in the Confessing Church which challenged Lutheran com-
plicity in the doings of the Third Reich. In 1939 he left the relative
security of a theological position in America to return to his troubled
homeland in order to participate in courageous resistance to the
"law" and "order" of the Third Reich. He was executed in 1944 by
the Gestapo, largely because his concern for Jews and all persons of
good will was enlarged considerably beyond his position in 1933.1
Pastor Neuhaus included in his centennial address a foreboding
prediction:
79. See P. TILLICH, LIFE AND ITS AMBIGUITIES, in SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 80-81
(1963).
80. See E. BETHGE, supra note 1; A. DUMAS, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER:
THEOLOGIAN OF REALITY 38-76 (1971); W. SHINER. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH
374, 1017, 1024, 1072 (1960).
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Unless [the public space of American law and Politics] is
democratically filled by the living moral traditions of the
American-people, it will surely be filled, as has so tragically
happened elsewhere, by the pretensions of the modern
state. As the crisis of legitimacy [of law] deepens, it will
lead-not next year, maybe not in twenty years, but all
too soon-to totalitarianism or to insurrection, or to
both. 1
If Neuhaus is correct, then our law schools should not be
generating lawyers who comply with all dictates of the state out of
misplaced reliance on Romans 13. On the contrary, we must begin now
the complicated task of correcting misunderstandings of that word of
the Lord, and we must not rest until we have trained persons as hard-
headed as Pastor Neuhaus and as bold as Pastor Bonhoeffer, who
wrote the following poem in his prison cell:
Guilt. I hear a trembling and quaking,
a murmur, a lamentation outbreaking,
hear anger within men's spirits rending.
In myriad voices maz-ily blending
a dumb choir
assails God's ear:
We, hunted by men and abused,
made defenceless and then accused,
unbearably burdened and losers
of all, we are yet the accusers.
We accuse all those who forced us to sinning,
who let us share in their guilt winning.
Into witnessing of injustice surprised us,
and then as partners in guilt despised us.
Our eyes upon outrage had to gaze
until we were lost in guilt's dark maze;
then they locked our mouths up fast,
dumb as dogs we became at last.
We too had learned to lie before long,
and adapted ourselves to public wrong
and when the defenceless were felled by force,
we took it all as a matter of course.
And what within our hearts still flamed
remained unspoken and unnamed;
we checked our blood's insurgent flow,
81. Neuhaus at 12.
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and trampled out the inward glow....
Brother, till after the long night
our dawn arise,
let us withstand."
82. Bonhoeffer, Prison, 1 UNION SEMINARY Q. REv. 6-8 (1946). For a moving ac-
count of one Christian community's solidarity with the Jews in occupied France and of
that community's united resistance to lawless authority, see P. HALLIE, LEST INNOCENT
BLOOD BE SHED, THE STORY OF THE VILLAGE OF LE CHAMBRON AND How GOODNESS
HAPPENED THERE (1979).
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